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linking 
up the 
slack
China's 'commodity economy' has thrown up some 
strange by-products. Kate Hannan examines the 
numerous problems of the rural sector.
n
n a cen tra lised  
economy, albeit one 
that contains a market 
sector, the twin 
problems of slack demand and 
rising unemployment are, to say 
the least, unusual. Until these 
problem s em erged econom ic 
'wisdom' had it that China has a 
suctio n-based  econom y that 
manifests scarcity, but provides full 
employment.
Today China’s economic planners 
find that they are faced with a situa­
tion where a significant number of 
enterprises are being merged with 
other enterprises or are closing, 
where an additional 130 million 
people will enter the workforce in 
the next ten years and, w here 
economic policy must address the 
problem of a ‘vicious circle’ of over­
extended enterp rise circu lating 
funds created by slack demand.
In an attempt in part, to unravel the 
current twin problems of a slack 
demand and rising unemployment I 
will begin by considering two fac­
tors - (i) the behaviour of advantaged 
state industrial enterprises, both 
during and after the decade of 
economic reform and (ii) the process 
of accum ulation and investment
that took place during the decade of 
reform, particularly in the rural sec­
tor.
During the decade of re form, China’s 
economic planners assumed that 
reform policy would increasingly 
resu lt in com p etition  betw een 
enterprises and that this would be 
com p etition  for profit. Indeed, 
economic reform policy did create 
competition between enterprises, 
but, rather than competing for profit 
per se, they competed for access to 
scarce production resources, the 
same resources now su b ject to 
demand slackness.
Under C hina’s econom ic reform 
p o licy , en te rp rise s  in creased  
production and econom ised on 
resources, as intended, but they also 
continued to measure enterprise 
‘success’ by the size of production 
output. The latter is a characteristic 
of a suction-based economy where 
consumer demand does not inform 
production output, rather scarcity 
allows almost all products produced 
to find a w illing consum er. As 
reform policy increasingly allowed 
enterprises to retain a significant 
portion of their profit, competition 
between ever-expanding enterprises 
took the form of competition for 
scarce production resources. In this
situation a cycle of shortage was fed, 
and advantaged state industrial 
enterprises gained an ‘edge’: an 
‘edge’ consisting of access to scarce 
producer resources through an 
ability
— to pay above the formal price for 
scarce resources,
— to barter for scarce resources,
— to cultivate favour advantages,
— to enjoy a relatively strong bar­
gain ing  p o sitio n  v is  & v is ad­
ministrative authorities at all levels,
— to provide private infrastructural 
reso u rces [i.e . a coal-burning 
electric plant), and
— to attract scarce  technically 
trained labour-power.
Given their competitive ‘edge’, ad­
vantaged enterprises were in a posi­
tion to reproduce and enhance their 
already favourable position and 
were generating a considerable call 
on funds over w hich enterprise 
m anagem ent co u ld  exercise 
decision-making power unimpeded 
by the direct control of central plan­
ners. At the same time, state central 
planners, aware of above-price pay­
ment for scarce resources, aware 
that these prices were fuelling infla­
tion and aware that fixed-asset in­
vestm en t w as escap in g  state 
planning control, attempted to exert
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greater influence over the use of 
enterprise funds. In this context the 
advantaged enterprises came up 
with an economic innovation allow­
ing them to tap funds that, like 
retained enterprise profit, lay out­
side direct central government con­
trol. These were the investment 
funds of township enterprises.
The advantaged enterprises' call on 
non-centrally controlled  funds, 
then, led directly to the exploitation 
of township funds by state industrial 
enterprises. They were thirsty for 
ever-expanded production capacity 
(indicating enterprise 'su ccess ') 
leading to a need for more and more 
production materials to feed this 
capacity.
At the beginning of the decade of 
reform, central government policy 
was to close the 'price-scissors' - the 
process whereby rural production, 
through the price system, provided 
accumulation for urban industrial 
development. But, in the last years 
of the reform  d ecad e, the ad­
vantaged state industrial enterprises 
significantly contributed to the un­
dermining of this policy by effec­
tively opening up a now channel for 
tapping rural accumulation for use 
in urban industrial development. 
This was done through gaining ac­
cess to township enterprise funds, 
themselves drawn in turn from a 
combination of rural agricultural ac­
cumulation and Agricultural Bank 
and agricultural co-operative loans 
designated for rural sector develop­
ment.
And, in time, the policy of tapping 
township funds did not stop at chan­
nelling investment from the rural to 
the industrial/urban sector of the 
economy (indeed, it was accom ­
panied by an urban consumption 
bias on a 2:1 ratio). During the period 
of economic contraction that has fol­
lowed the decade of econom ic 
reform, another legacy of this policy 
became all too evident: township 
unemployment.
Clearly, future township unemploy­
ment was u n fo reseen . W hen 
township en terp rises provided 
funds for advantaged enterprises, 
they saw themselves as investing 
lunds in return for scarce produc­
tion resources. They could not have 
known that in the post economic
reform climate of economic contrac­
tion and state anti-corruption con­
trol, advantaged enterprises would 
reduce their liabilities, not through 
reducing their core labour force, but 
through cutting their ties with satel­
lite township enterprises. This has 
been a policy that has significantly 
contributed to the situation where 
three million township enterprises 
have been closed or merged and 
where there has been a correspond­
ing decline in rural per capita in­
come.
Under the economic reform policy 
the primary form of rural accumula­
tion came to be private household 
production. This form of produc­
tion provided funds for investment 
in the township enterprises, which
most often manufactured industrial 
goods ra th er than p ro cessing  
agricultural produce. Some became 
satellite enterprises by entering into 
contract arrangements with urban 
based state industrial enterprises. It 
was, as noted above, a situation 
w hereby tow nship  en terp rises  
provided funding for a form of in­
dustrial development outside direct 
state control.
Current [1990-91] policy has had to 
recognise that rural accumulation, 
instead of funding investment in in­
dustrial production, could be better 
used to support agricultural produc­
tion. By 1990 the State was investing 
more than twice the 1988 figure in 
projects aimed at increasing farm 
production and contral planners* 
econom ic statem ents no longer 
glowed with accounts of China’s 
richness in terms of rural labour 
power resources. The argument was 
no longer being made that:
It is of great importance to
transfer a large portion of
manpower away from farming 
to the secondary and tertiary 
industries and thus make full 
use of it...to develop diversified 
rural economies...1
The corresponding argument now 
used was that:
The surplus labour force in 
agriculture should be absorbed 
and digested within the scope 
of agriculture. Agriculture is the 
foundation of national 
economic development. So long 
as agriculture continues to 
develop, it will be easier to 
arrange the rural labour force, 
and the cities will also find it 
easier to solve their 
employment issue....*
Planners are now recognising that 
rural industries are having a rela­
tively “hard time”. A 1990 survey of 
rural incomes showed that actual 
per capita income dropped by 4% 
and that for the first time cash in­
com e from tow nship and town 
enterprises experienced negative 
growth. The survey showed that 
even such regions as Beijing, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong “whose economies 
have been developing rapidly at a 
high level" showed decreases in per 
capita rural income. In the 4Ui_6 of 
this situation the Agricultural Bank 
of China has now been authorised to 
increase its lending to township 
en terp rises by 11 b illio n  yuan 
(SA3.5 billion) to be used as working 
capital.
China's planners are now arguing 
that “the rural contracted respon­
s ib ility  sy stem , based  on the 
household and with remuneration 
linked  to ou tp ut, (the form  of 
primary accum ulation promoted 
during the decade of econom ic 
reform ] should be further con­
solidated and improved”3 but that, 
the next accumulation and invest­
ment step promoted by economic 
reform policy, i.e., re-investment of 
funds accumulated in the course of 
private agricultural production or 
borrowed from rural bank and co­
operative sources, will be blocked. 
This, it is currently argued, is "be­
cause the capacity of township and 
town enterprises is limited”.
Currently planners have had to 
come to terms with a situation where 
“a part o f the labor force they
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[township enterprises] hired...[is 
being] laid off and sent back to 
agriculture" and, a situation where, 
"w ith  lim ited scope for jobs in 
cities", “a substantial number of 
surplus labor forces in the tradition­
al farming industry” must be ex­
pected.4
Under the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
[1991-7], the focus has shifted from 
industrial development per se to 
developing agricultural production, 
especially any available rural export 
p o ten tia l, together w ith  ‘b asic  
industries’ such as energy and raw 
materials. Current increased loans to 
township industries involved in in­
dustrial production may thus be 
seen as paralleling past subsidies of 
the price of basic foodstuffs to urban 
workers, in the sense that they are 
loans designed to dampen the social 
dissatisfaction expected to accom­
pany loss of real income.
Even allowing for the focus of the 
argument presented above, it would 
be wrong to blame all current un­
employment in China, or even all 
township unemployment, on the be­
haviour of advantaged enterprises 
vis k vis tow nship  en terp rises 
during the decade of reform. Other 
important factors must be recog­
nised, the most important being 
problems of slack demand.
Chinese planners’ analyses of the 
cause of current slack demand fall 
into two categories. The first at­
tributes the problem to the recent 
substantial in crease in savings 
deposits. The second, beginning 
from the promise that "reducing 
savings deposits will not help en­
liven the sluggish  m arket", at­
tributes it to a variety of inter-related 
factors. These include:
(i) harsh contractive measures taken 
in the early period of economic con­
traction;
(ii) greater screening and rectifica­
tion of enterprise behaviour;
(iii) effective measures to cut back 
government institutions’ purchase 
of consumer goods;
(iv) the current reduction in demand 
for materials for fixed asset develop­
ment.
The second factor listed is, alone, 
recognised as having, by late April
1990, led to the closure or incorpora­
tion into other entities of more than
100,000 enterprises.
Policy consequent on such analysis 
has, since the third and fourth 
quarters of 89, been based on the 
view that the enterprise ‘debt chain’ 
that has arisen from enterprise in­
ability to sell their product and so 
pay their debts, should be the first 
issue addressed. Bank loans have 
been used as a ‘starting device’. In­
deed, these are loans made possible 
by the current increased level of 
savings. It is estimated that "of the 
in crea sed  lo an s offered  [to 
enterprises] by banks and credit 
cooperatives, two-thirds came from 
savings deposits”.*
‘T he to p ics  of co n v ersatio n  
nowadays’ are mostly about how
best to approach the problem of 
slack demand. But, in practice, 
policy has not consisted of the most 
d iscussed policy suggestions of 
readjusting the product mix, in­
creasing production of those items 
which are readily marketable and in 
short supply, and, cutting back 
production cost and promoting 
sales, especially in rural areas.8 In­
stead. it has taken the form of the 
bank loans noted above and, even 
more recently, a clearly defined 
period of enterprise debt clearance. 
The latter consisting of bank assis­
tan ce  exten d ed  to en terp rises  
specifically for clearing accumu­
lated enterprise debts of over 50,000 
yuan [SA15.000] incurred between 
1/1/89 and 31/3/90. It is assistance 
that carries with it very tight govern­
ment control of enterprise funds.
A formal planning consequence of a 
decade of econom ic reform, fol­
lowed by a period of centrally in­
duced economic contraction, is an 
Eighth Five Year Plan that moves 
China’s planning focus from rural 
industrial to agricultural develop­
ment and seeks to use the present 
period of economic contraction as 
“an opportunity" to influence in­
vestment in order to give priority to 
urban and rural infrastructure. But 
another consequence of this same 
period' is that Chinese planners, are 
faced not only with a situation of 
merging and closing enterprises, but 
also with the need to dampen the 
social effects of rising unemploy­
ment as well as trying to break out of 
the vicious circle of:
Overspending of circulating 
funds— less investments in 
fixed assets for economic 
sectors short of 
funds...— uncoordinated 
investment
structure—unbalanced 
production structure— further 
increase in the spending of 
circulating funds...7
The slack market that has led to this 
cycle together with the accompany­
ing unemployment are very unusual 
concerns within the context of a 
centralised economy. Indeed, they 
are so unusual that the established 
w isdom  of the eco n o m ists  of 
centralised economies is unable to 
h elp . C learly , new  th eses are 
needed. These will need to be in­
formed by an understanding of the 
effect of interacting central and 
private economic sectors within the 
frame of a centralised economy, 
together with perceptive analysis of 
the effect of centrally enforced curbs 
on fixed asset investment and on the 
corruption that "oils" a centralised 
economy.
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